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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from a decision of the district court reversing on intermediate appeal the 
Magistrate's characterization in a decree of divorce that a parcel of real property was community 
property. Appellant Susan Kraly Ahearn (hereinafter "Ahearn") appeals the decision of District 
Judge, Steve Yerby wherein the district court concluded that 60 acres of land deeded to Ahearn 
.and her husband, Stanely Kraly, as husband and wife, during their marriage, was Kraly's 
separate property. Ahearn further appeals the decision of Magistrate Judge, Justin W. Julian that, 
upon finding the acreage community property, Kraly was entitled to reimbursement of the 
purchase price of the property. 
B. Statement of Facts & Course of Proceedings 
Stanley Kraly and Susan Ahearn were married on April 12, 2003 in the Stuart, Florida. 
Shortly after their marriage, Kraly sold his primary residence in Palm City, Florida which 
resulted in net sale proceeds in excess of $536,000. Following the sale, Kraly used a portion of 
the proceeds from his Palm City residence to purchase sixty acres of unimproved property 
located near Rapid Lightning Creek Road in Bonner County, Idaho, for $167,500. The warranty 
deed conveying the property conveyed to "Stan Kraly and Susan Kraly, Husband and Wife". 
Kraly purchased other property, also in Idaho, taking that property solely in his own name. 
On October 5, 2004 Kraly filed a complaint for divorce based upon the grounds of 
irreconcilable differences. (R., pp. 10-11.) 
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Trial on the issues of the distribution of the parties' property located within the State of 
Idaho was held on March I, 2006. (See, Transcript, generally.) The only witnesses to testify at 
trial were the parties themselves. (Id.) 
At the conclusion of the trial the Magistrate entered a written Final Decree of Divorce. 
(R., pp. 105-109.) In its written findings, the Magistrate stated: 
The Court finds that the real property located in Bonner County, Idaho consisting of 60 
acres on Rapid Lightning Creek Road is a community asset. The Court further finds that 
the Plaintiff proved by clear and convincing evidence that the source of funds to entirely 
purchase the property was from the Plaintiffs separate property, and there was no 
evidence of any intent by the Plaintiff to gift his separate property purchase monies to the 
Defendant by the warranty deed alone. The Plaintiff successfully traced and proved his 
separate property investment in the asset in the amount of $1(57,500. The $167,500 
purchase price of the real property shall be awarded to the Plaintiff as his sole and 
separate property. Any enhanced value of the real property in excess of $167,500 
(representing Plaintiffs separate property interest) shall be a community property asset 
and shared equally by the parties;· 
(R., p. 108.) 
On appeal from the Magistrate's Division of the district court the district court reversed 
the Magistrate's characterization of the Lightning Creek as "community property" and awarded 
the property, along with any natural enhancement in the value of the property to Kraly as his 
separate property. (R., pp. 140-146.) 
OnJanuary 16, 2008, Ahearn-timely filed this appeal. (R., pp.148-151.) 
2 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Did the district court err in setting aside the Magistrate's finding that the Lightning Creek 
property was community property and characterizing the property as Kraly' s separate 
property? 
2. Upon its finding that the Lightning Creek property was community property, did the 
Magistrate err in concluding that Kraly was entitled to reimbursement of his separate 
property funds used to purchase the property? 
3. Notwithstanding the characterization of the Lightning Creek property as either the 
community property ofKraly and Ahearn, as husband and wife, or_Kraly's separate 
property, is Kraly estopped from challenging on appeal the Magistrate's distribution of 
the asset since the Magistrate's distribution was consistent with Kraly's sworn admission 
at trial as to the nature and extent of Ahearn's interest in the property? 
3 
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ARGUMENT 
The district court erred in characterizing the Lightning Creek property as Kraly' s separate 
property as there was substantial competent evidence at trial to find the presumptive 
character of the property as community property unrebutted. 
A. Introduction 
On appeal from the Magistrate's Division, the district court reversed the Magistrate's 
characterization of the Lightning Creek property as community property holding that the 
property was Kraly's separate property. (R., pp. 5-10.) The district court's reasoning for its 
decision was based upon two findings of the Magistrate: (1) that Kraly had purchased the 
acreage using proceeds from his separate property thereby rebutting the community property 
presumption, and (2) Ahearn' s name on the deed cannot serve to create a community interest in 
the property. (R., pp. 5-8.) In its reasoning the district court erred. 
B. Standard of Review 
In general, a magistrate judge's findings of fact will not be set aside on appeal unless they 
are clearly erroneous such that they are not based upon substantial and competent evidence. 
Stewart v. Stewart, 143 Idaho 673, 152 P.3d 544 (2007). On appeal, appellate courts will 
exercise free review over the magistrate's conclusions of law. Id. 
Characterization of property as separate or community property involves mixed questions 
oflaw and fact. Krebs v. Krebs, 114 Idaho 571,579 P.2d 77 (Ct. App. 1988). Moreto--the point, 
an appellate court, if there is competent evidence ofa trial court's characterization of.property as 
either separate or community, is bound by the findings of the trial court. 
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[T]his court is confronted with the findings of fact of the trial court, and with the general 
rule that a finding of a trial court that property is either separate or community, when 
supported by competent evidence, is binding and conclusive upon the appellate court. If it 
is based upon conflicting evidence or upon evidence which is subject to different 
inferences, we will not disturb such a finding on appeal. A fortiori where that finding is 
based upon evidence which is neither conflicting nor controverted at trial, it must be 
upheld. 
Cargill v. Hancock, 92 Idaho 460,444 P.2d 421 (1968) (citations omitted). 
It is a well settled principle ofidaho's community property Jaw that property acquired 
after the date of marriage, is presumed to be community property. Reed v. Reed, 137 Idaho 53, 
44 P.3d 1108 (2002). 
In the case at bar, the Magistrate found the Lightning Creek property to be a community 
asset. "In this case this is a piece of community property. We know that because it was acquired 
during the marriage. So it's community property." (Tr., p. 177, Ls.15-17; see, also, Tr., p. 181, 
Ls. 7, 14-18.) The record in this case clearly supports the presumptive characterization of 
community property, as the parties were married on April, 12, 2003, and property was purchased 
in March of 2004. 
This presumptive characterization can be rebutted, but the party asserting the 
characterization of the property as being separate bears the burden of proof. Reed, 137 Idaho 53, 
44P.3d1108. Theassertingparty can only carry this bur..den by proving the separate nature of 
the asset with a reasonably certain and particular level of proof. Id. Kraly will argue on appeal 
that he met his burden of proof by establishing the source of the funds purchasing the property as 
his separate property. The evidence adduced at trial included documentary evidence of the wire 
transfer of the purchasing funds, and testimony regarding the intent of the parties when they 
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purchased the property. The record also includes the recorded deed for the property, naming 
"Stan Kraly and Susan Kraly, Husband and Wife" as fee simple owners. The deed was admitted 
into evidence, without objection from Kraly. (Def. Ex. "A"; see also Tr., p. 91, L. I - p. 92, L. 
23.) 
Based upon the proffered testimony and documentary evidence, the Magistrate 
characterized the acreage as a community asset; clearly the trial court found Kraly did not meet 
his burden of proof as to the separate nature of the property. The acreage unequivocally is 
subject to the presumption of community characterization, and the trial court further 
characterized the property as belonging to the community after considering evidence subject to 
differing inferences. Applying the standard of review as stated by the Cargill Court, the trial 
court's characterization of the property as a community asset must stand upon appeal. Further, as 
argued infra, the recorded deed is dispositive of the community nature of the Lightning Creek 
property. 
C. The recorded deed is unambiguous and therefore dispositive as to the community 
nature of the property. 
In Hall v.Hall,116 Idaho 483, 77 P.2d 255 (1989), the Idaho Supreme Court ruled on 
whether parol evidence is admissible to prove ~he parties intention when a deed unambiguously 
recites the transfer of the disputed property to a husband and wife. 
Where possible, the cou1i should give effect to the intention of the parties to a deed. 
Gardner v. Fliegel, 92 Idaho 767, 450 P.2d 990 (1969). Where the language of a deed is 
plain and unambiguous the intention of the parties must be determined from the deed 
itself, and parol evidence is not admissible to show intent. Id. Oral and written statements 
are generally inadmissible to contradict or vary unambiguous terms contained in a deed. 
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French v. Brinkman, 60 Cal.2d 54 7, 35 Cal.Rptr. 289, 387 P .2d 1 (1963); Neeley v. 
Kelsch, 600 P .2d 979 (Utah 1979). 
Hall, 116 Idaho at 484. 
The factual scenario in Hall involved a transfer of ranch property in Horseshoe Bend, 
Idaho from the husband's grandparents to the husband and wife. Specifically, the deed in 
question in the Hall read as follows: 
For Value Received, THOMAS R. FAULL, SR., also known as Thomas R. Faull, Thos. 
R. Faull, Thomas Richard Faull, Sr., and Thomas Faull and FLORA M. FAULL, husband 
and wife, grantors, do hereby grant, bargain, sell and convey unto ANTHONY M. HALL 
and CAROLYN S. HALL, husband and wife, the grantees, ... the following described 
premises .... 
Hall, 116 Idaho at 484. 
The issue in Hall was determining whether the grandparents had gifted the excess value 
of the ranch above the purchase price to their grandson as his separate property; as the Halls had. 
purchased the property with $60,000 of community funds and the husband's grandmother 
testified at trial the property was worth $100,000 when sold. Id. The case was argued to the 
Court of Appeals, which enumerated the principle of not admitting parol evidence contradicting 
an unambiguous deed. Hall v. Hall, 112 Idaho 641, 734 P.2d 666 (Ct. App. 1987). Upon 
petition for review the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals. Hall v. Hall, 116 
Idaho 483, 777 P.2d 255. 
The Supreme Court has continued to follow the Hall decision in Bliss v. Bliss, calling the 
policies underlying Hall and similar cases "well founded and enduring." Bliss v. Bliss, 127 Idaho 
7 
170, 898 P .2d 1081. In Bliss, the Supreme Court ruled evidence of a husband contradicting an 
unambiguous deed conveying property to his wife as her separate property was not admissible. 
The record in the case at bar reflects the recorded Warranty Deed as expressly granting a 
fee simple estate to the Appellant and the Respondent as husband and wife. The recorded deed 
was admitted into evidence, without objection or argument as to whether the express language of 
the deed was ambiguous. (Tr., p. 91, L. l - p.92, L. 23.) The language on the deed is as follows: 
For Value Received LARRY LITTLE, A Married Man as his sole and separate 
property and DONALD CHARLES, A Single Man, the grantors, do hereby grant, 
bargain, sell and convey unto STAN KRALY and SUSAN KRAL Y, Husband and 
Wife, the grantees whose current address is 4300 BAYSHORE TERRACE, STUART, 
FL 34997, the following premises, in Bonner County Idaho ... 
(Def. Ex. "A") 
Kraly has claimed from the beginning the characterization of the Lightning Creek 
property was wholly separate property. Kraly relies upon case law either dealing with personal 
property assets, as in Worzala and Batra, or in cases involving real property acquired during 
marriage, but deeded in the name of one party only, as in Stanger and Pringle. See, Worzala v. 
Worzala, 128 Idaho 408, 913 P.2d 1178 (l 996); Batra v. Batra, 135 Idaho 388, 17 P.3d 889 (Ct. 
App. 2001); Pringle v. Pringle, 109 Idaho 1026, 712 P.2d 727 (Ct. App. 1985); Stanger v. 
Stanger, 98Jdaho 725, 571 P.2d 1126-EJ-977), Upon review of Cargill, a case heavily relied -
upon by Kraly before tne district court, it is unclear as to whether there was a deed in evidence 
(as opposed to a contraet as discussed by the Cargill court); however, that court did not undergo 
any analysis as directly relevant to the case at bar as that performed by the Hall court. Compare 
Cargill v. Hancock, 92 Idaho 460 (!960) with Hall v. Hall, 116 Idaho 483, 77 P.2d 255 (1989). 
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For example, the Kraly deed bears a striking similarity to the Hall deed; a deed whose 
language was found by the Supreme Court to be unambiguous and therefore dispositive as to the 
estate it conveyed to the community. The Kraly deed clearly and unambiguously granted a fee 
simple estate to Kraly and Ahearn as husband and wife, therefore the only proper 
characterization of the Lightning Creek is as a community asset in its entirety, as in Hall. 
The Magistrate's characterization of the Lightning Creek property as a community asset 
is based upon competent evidence, surmised from the unambiguous, express language of the 
recorded deed. Pursuant to the Cargill court's standard of review the trial court characterization 
must be upheld. Ahearn respectfully requests this Court to uphold the Ma.gistrate's 
characterization of the acreage as a community asset. Ahearn further requests this Court, as a 
matter of law, to award her a full and equal community share. 
In an especially relevant passage to the case at bar, Judge Swl'!nstrom, in his Hall Court of 
Appeals opinion, provided guidance as to the characterization of real property: 
To overcome the community presumption the party named in the deed must present 
evidence proving the separate source of the property. In cases where the deed names the 
spouse, but does not indicate that the property is separate property, other evidence, 
including parol evidence, is necessary. This parol evidence does not vary or contradict 
the deed and is therefore admissible. However, where the deed names both spouses, as 
husband and wife, the same parol evidence showing a separate interest necessarily 
varies the deed. This evidence is barred by the parol ·evidence rule unless the rule is 
inapplicable to a divorce case. In Suchan v. Suchan. l 06 Idaho 654, 682 P .2d 607 
(1984), our Supreme Court applied the general rule of construction of an unambiguous 
contract to an agreement between spouses involved in a divorce. We see no reason to 
treat a deed differently. Our courts are not guided by a separate set of evidence rules in 
divorce cases. A party seeking to rebut the presumption that property acquired during 
marriage is community property must stand or fall on admissible evidence. 
Hall, 112 at 643 (emphasis added); see also, Hall 116 Idaho 483,486 (1989) (wherein 
9 
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Judge Bistline's concurring opinion extensively quote's Judge Swanstrom's opinion). 
Kraly's contention is based entirely upon evidence standing in stark contrast to the 
express terms of the deed. Outside the deed itself, the record in this case only contains evidence 
presented by Kraly tracing the source of the money for the purchase of the property and his 
subjective recollection of the parties' intent when they bought their acreage. When faced with a 
similar issue, the Hall court found: 
The deed was clear and unambiguous as to the grantees and the estate conveyed. 
Therefore, testimony claiming that the $40,000 'gift' was solely to the husband was in 
reality an attempt not to clarify the amount of consideration but to vary other 
unambiguous terms of the deed. When offered for this purpose, the testimony violated 
the parol evidence rule. 
Hall, 112 at 643. 
On appeal before the district court, Kraly cited Hall as standing for the proposition that 
Ahearn could not testify as to whether Kraly gifted the purchase of the Lightning Creek acreage. 
App. Brief, pp 11 though pp. 12. However this is precisely what Kraly is trying to do by relying 
on his subjective testimony to carry his onerous burden of proving the separate property nature 
of the acreage. Any testimony as to the separate nature of the property directly contradicts the 
deed, which is clearly parol evidence, and therefore inadmissible to prove the characterization of-
the property. The only admissible evidence on record that should speak to the parties' intention 
is the deed itself, and as argued this deed unambiguously conveyed the property to the 
community. 
Kraly also argued on appeal before the district court the Lightning Creek property was 
not transmuted from separate property to community property, as there was no evidence of a gift 
10 
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and any alleged transmutation did not meet the requisite formalities required by Idaho law. 
Simply stated, this analysis is unnecessary under Hall and its progeny. The property was 
presumptively community property when it was acquired during marriage and remained 
community property when the deed was recorded in the community's name. As a matter of law 
Ahearn should be awarded a full one-half community interest in the property. 
D. Should this Appellate Court not award Ahearn a full one-half community interest 
in the property, this Court should affirm the trial court's characterization of the 
asset and affirm Ahearn's remaining interest in the property. 
If this Court is not willing to award Ahearn her full one-half community interest in the 
Lightning Creek acreage, she would respectfully request the Court affirm Magistrate Judge 
Julian's ruling. As argued herein, testimony regarding the source of the funds could only be 
admissible if it finds the terms of the deed to be ambiguous. 
If the language in the deed is ambiguous, then evidence of all the surrounding facts and 
circumstances is admissible to prove the parties' intent. Gardner v. Fliegel, supra. The 
parol evidence rule does not preclude the use of extrinsic evidence to explain the parties' 
intent when the provisions of a writing are ambiguous. Ness v. Greater Arizona Realty, 
Inc., 117 Ariz.357,572P.2dl I 95(App. l 977). -
Hall, 1 I 6 Idaho at 256. 
As explained by Judge Swanstrom in Hall, an example would be the situation where real 
property is acquired cturing th""marriage, but deeded in onl}cone party's name. The presumption 
of community property would arise, but th~,e would be, for lack of a better term, an overt 
ambiguity as to the parties' intent. Paro! e:vidence is then admissible so as to allow the trial court 
to make a proper characterization of the property. Under Cargill, if the parol evidence is 
11 
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conflicting or subject to differing inferences, as argued infra, the characterization of the trial 
court must stand, as long as it is based upon competent evidence. Cargill, 92 Idaho 460 (1960). 
In this matter, parol evidence was properly admitted to explain the purchase of two other 
pieces of property by Kraly during the course of his marriage to Ahearn. While acquired during 
the marriage, the two properties, (Tr. Ct. Ex. Items 12, 13), were deeded to Kraly alone. He was 
then able to properly bring in admissible parol evidence to prove they were indeed his separate 
property. As stated by the Magistrate, the Lightning Creek property clearly stands in "a slightly 
different position." (Tr., p. 178, L. 1.) 
Regardless ofKraly's contention the Lightning Creek acreage is his separate property, 
the record is replete with evidence of the parties intending to undergo the transaction to purchase 
and hold acting as a community. By Kraly's own admission the parties had discussed 
contributing to the property as a community. (Tr. p. 49, L. 19 - p. 50, L. 6; Tr. p. 94, L.14-16.) 
The record indicates that Kraly paid for the taxes on the property, but there is no proof of what 
the source of these payments were, and a reasonable presumption would be the payments were 
made out of community income. (Tr. p. 50, L. 24 - p. 51, L.1.) The evidence shows the parties 
actively sought out this property for purchase. (Tr. p. 49 line 18 through 23; Tr. p. 90 line 19 
through p. 91 line 11.) Finally, !lie parties even hired an attorney together to pursue a lawsuit 
over an undisclosed timber harvest. (Def. Ex. "C"; see also Tr. p. I 00 line 6 through p. 101 line 
6.) Several times throughout his testimony, Kraly admits this property was community in nature. 
(See, Tr., p. 107 line 23 through line 24.; p.110 lines 2 through line 25.) As Kraly stated," ... I 
wanted to buy a piece of property that was mutually owned ... That was a piece of property for 
12 
my family to live on." (Tr. p. 130 line 22 through pp. 131 line 8.) It goes without saying Ahearn 
believed the parties intention was to own the property as a community. (Tr. p. 134 line 1 through 
pp. 135 line 16.) 
As stated infra, and quoted at length the trial judge characterized the Lightning Creek 
acreage as a community asset. This characterization must stand on appeal, as it quite clearly is 
based upon the intentions of the parties to own the parcel as husband and wife. At the very least 
Ahearn is entitled to what was awarded by the Magistrate and respectfully requests this Court to, 
as an alternative to a full one-half community interest, affirm the Magistrate's decision. 
On appeal, this Court may conclude that the Magistrate made insufficient findings of fact 
to support the conclusion that Kraly failed to rebut the presumption that the Lightning Creek 
property is community property. 
I.R.C.P. 52(a) requires that a court make findings of fact and conclusions of!aw. Rule 
52(a) states: 
In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall 
find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon and direct the 
entry of an appropriate judgment; ... Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes 
of review. Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. In the 
application of this principle regard shall be given to the special opportunity of the trial 
court to judge the credibility of those witnesses who appear personally before it. 
Findings required by Rule 52(a) should lie clear, coherent, and complete while avoiding an 
unnecessary review of the evidence. Vanderford Co., Inc., v. Knudson, 144 Idaho 547, 554, 165 
P .3d 26 I, 268 (2007). 
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In this matter, Ahearn does not contest that the Magistrate made findings of fact in its 
oral pronouncement of its decision immediately following trial. Ahearn also does not contest the 
absence of findings may be disregarded by an appellate court where the record is clear and yields 
an obvious answer to the relevant question. See, Vanderford Co., Inc., v. Knudson, supra; see, 
also, Pope v. lntermountain Gas Co., 103 Idaho 217,225,646 P.2d 988,996 (1982). However, 
the purpose of the underlying rule is to "afford the appellate court a clear understanding of the 
basis of the trial court's decision so that it might be determined whether the trial court applied 
the proper law to the appropriate facts in reaching its ultimate judgment." Id. 
In the event this Appellate Court cannot make a clear understanding of the basis for the 
Magistrate's decision, Ahearn invites the Court to remand this matter for clarification by the 
Magistrate. 
II. The Magistrate erred in concluding that Kraly was entitled to reimbursement of his 
separate property funds used to purchase the property. 
As set forth above, the distric_t court erred in setting aside the Magistrate's finding that the 
Lightning Creek acreage was Kraly's separate property because there was substantial competent 
evidence upon which the Magistrate could (and did) rely to establish the character of the 
property. The Magistrate found the property to be a community property. However, upon 
finding the acreage to be community property, the Magistrate held that Kraly was entitled to 
recoup the funds he used to purchase the property, and then awarded the remaining value of the 
property comprised of the natural increase in the value of the land as community property. In 
doing this the Magistrate erred. 
14 
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In Idaho, it is clear that the natural increase in value of community property is of the 
same character and is also community property. See, Stanger v. Stanger, 98 Idaho 725,571 P.2d 
1126 (1977). Properly characterizing the Lightning Creek acreage as community property the 
Magistrate was required to distribute the asset and the value of its natural increase in value one-
half each to Kraly and Ahearn. 
III. Under the doctrine of judicial estoppel Kraly is barred from asserting that Ahearn 
possess no interest in the Lightning Creek acreage. 
Even if this Appellate Court is to conclude that the Magistrate erred in finding the 
Lightning Creek property a community property asset, and further erred in granting Ahearn a 
one-half interest in the proceeds of the property above and beyond the purchase price Kraly paid 
with his separate property, this Court should still affirm the Magistrate's ruling as to the division 
of the Lightning Creek asset applying the doctrine of"judicial estoppel". 
The doctrine of judicial estoppel, sometimes also known as the doctrine of preclusion of 
inconsistent positions, "precludes a party from gaining an advantage by taking one position, and 
then seeking a second advantage by taking an incompatible position ... " McKay v. Owens, 130 
Idaho 148, 152, 937 P.2d 1222, 1226 (1997) (citing, Risse/to v. Plumbers and Steamfitters Local 
343, 94 F.3d 597,600 (9th Cir. 1996)). 
In McKay v. Owens, 130 Idaho 148, 937 P.2d 1222, the Supreme Court set forth the 
important policies behind the doctrine: 
The policies underlying preclusion of inconsistent positions are general considerations of 
the orderly administration of justice and regard for the dignity of judicial proceedings .... 
Judicial estoppel is intended to protect against a litigant playing fast and loose with the 
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courts ... Because it is intended to protect the dignity of the judicial process, it is an 
equitable doctrine invoked by a court at its discretion. 
130 Idaho at 152, 937 P.2d at 1226. 
The doctrine of judicial estoppel precludes a party from taking one position on an issue in 
the trial court and the opposite position on appeal. E.g., Fairmain v. District of Columbia, 934 
A.2d 438 (Dist. of Columbia Ct. App. 2007); State v. Edwardsen, 430 N.W.2d 604 (Wis. Ct. 
App. 1988). 
In the instant matter, judicial estoppel prohibits Kraly from being heard to complain that 
the Magistrate erred in awarding Ahearn a one-half interest in the Lightning Creek Property less 
the purchase price because that is the very interest Kraly stated Ahearn p~;;sessed in his sworn 
testimony. At trial, Kraly admitted that Ahearn possessed an ownership interest in the property. 
(Tr., p. 110, Ls. 23-25.) Though not taking into account his own one-half interest in the 
appreciated value of the land, Kraly also testified that Ahearn's interest in the property was 
whatever the property had appreciated in value Jess the diminution in value cause by the timber 
harvest, and less the private money he put in to purchase the property coming from the sale of his 
separate property, Palm City, Florida home. (Tr, p. 109, L. 11 - p. 110, L. 8.) Thus, by his 
admissions at trial, Kraly has conceded that Ahearn possessed an interest in the Lightning Creek 
property that was consistent with the Magistrate's decision in distributing the asset. By filing his 
appeal and arguing to the district court -- and also this Court -- that Ahearn possesses no interest 
in the property, Kraly is attempting to repudiate his prior acknowledgment that Ahearn possesses 
an interest in the Lightning Creek acreage. 
16 
... , .. ,., ..... -.·-,=·~. -:::-:-:-:,...,.,.-· 
For the protection of the dignity of judicial proceedings this Appellate Court should 
exercise its discretion and bar Kraly from arguing on appeal the Magistrate erred in its division 
of the Lightning Creek asset. 
CONCLUSION 
As a matter of fact and law, Ahearn is entitled to her full one-half interest in Lightning 
Creek acreage. Clearly, the property was presumptively a community asset when it was 
purchased during the parties' marriage, and it retained that characterization when the deed 
conveyed the property in fee simple to "Stan Kraley and Susan Kraly, Husband and Wife". 
The terms of the deed are unambiguous, and under Hall this Court_must give due 
deference to the parties' intent as expressly stated. Accordingly, this Court must reverse the 
decision of the district court finding the Lightning Creek property Kraly's separate property. In 
the alternative, the record more than substantiates the Magistrate's characterization of the 
property as a community asset, subject to a claim for the purchase price by Kraly. 
Based upon the foregoing, Ahearn respectfully requests this Court reverse the decision of 
the district court finding the Lightning Creek acreage Kraly's separate property and reverse the 
decision of the Magistrate granting Kraly reimbursement for the purchase price of.the property, 
or grant whatever relief it deems fair and just under the circumstances. 
Dated this 27'h day of June 2008: --
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